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Defendants and Appellees Gregory Smedsrud and LouAnn Smedsrud submit the
following Appellees'Brief in the above-referenced proceeding.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellees agree with Appellant's statement of jurisdiction of this case.
PARTIES TO THE APPEAL
The parties to the appeal are Plaintiff and Appellant J. Pochynok Company, Inc.
(hereafter "Pochynok"), and Defendants and Appellees Gregory Smedsrud and LouAnn
Smedsrud (hereafter "Smedsruds").
STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the trial court properly followed the Supreme Court's mandate on

remand by making factual determinations necessary to determine that Smedsruds were the
"successful parties" in this case for the purposes of awarding attorneys fees based upon
the jury verdict rendered in this matter.
This issue concerns the trial court's apportionment of costs (including attorneys'
fees) under Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-17 and 38-1-18. As applicable case law clothes the
trial court with discretion in this analysis, its decision in this regard is reviewable under
an abuse of discretion standard - Shupe v. Menlove, 18 Utah 2d 130, 417 P.2d 246
(1966); AK&R Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guy, 47 P.3d 92 (UT App 2002); Ault v.
Holden, 44 P. 3d 781 (Utah 2002).
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2.

Whether the trial court properly denied Pochynok's Motion to Set Aside

Garnishment, for Restitution, and to Reinstate Mechanic's Lien; alternatively, whether the
trial court's entry of findings and conclusions rendered that Motion moot.
Smedsrud challenges that this issue was properly preserved incident to this appeal.
The general question of the propriety of the trial court's garnishment proceeding was
previously appealed to this court (Appeal No. 20020940), and affirmed by this Court's
prior decision therein (J. Pochynok Company, Inc. V. Gregory Smedsrud and Louann
Smedsrud, 2003 UT App 80; P.3d 563, Addendum at No. 1). The issue was not accepted
for review by the Supreme Court on certiorari - see Supreme Court decision in J.
Pochynok Company, Inc. V. Gregory Smedsrud and Louann Smedsrud, 2005 UT 39,116
P.3d 353, Addendum at No. 2. Neither was any review of the garnishment order made
part of the order on remand - Addendum at No. 2. Accordingly, it was not properly
before the trial court on remand, and is not properly before this court on appeal.
To the extent properly appealable, the trial court's ruling on this issue (assuming
that such ruling may be implied from the findings and conclusions entered - see
Argument at Point II, below) was not based on "a misunderstanding or misapplication of
the law", but followed from the carrying out of the Supreme Court's mandate to enter
findings and conclusions bearing on whether Smedsruds remained the"successful party"
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at trial. Again, given the court's underlying discretion in determining the "successful
party" in this action, the trial court's ruling should be viewed for abuse of discretion
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case concerns the construction of a residence in Summit County, State of
Utah. Smedsruds, as owners, were sued by Pochynok for breach of contract and quantum
meruit. Pochynok further sought to foreclose the later of two mechanic's liens asserted
against the Smedsruds' residence. Smedsruds counterclaimed, asserting defective
workmanship and failure to complete the project.
The matter was set for jury trial commencing May 21,2002. On May 9,2002,
counsel for Smedsruds presented Pochynok with an offer of judgment in the amount of
$40,000 (see Addendum at No. 3 hereto, R 408-410). Pochynok declined the offer, and
the case proceeded to trial on the claim as pleaded, Smedsrud having paid no portion
thereof, to Pochynok or its subcontractors, in the interim.
The case was tried to a jury on May 21 -22,2002. In its case in chief, Pochynok
initially claimed $81,269.91 in damages (having plead $74,360.51 in its Complaint - R.
1-6; 200-207); during the course of trial, though, Plaintiff/Appellant was inconsistent in
the computation of its claim. Defendants, by contrast, presented evidence that they were
entitled to significant offsets for unearned supervisor fees, work defects and delays.
Defendants further produced evidence that they had never received a consistent
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accounting from plaintiff despite nearly three years of negotiations and attempts,
contradictory and inconsistent claims coming from plaintiff right up to the eve of trial.
See Defendants' Exhibits D-29 and D-46. Had plaintiff been willing to discuss a
consistent claim in light of defendants' demands and offsets, the case would not have
gone to trial; absent a cogent accounting, though, defendants had no choice but to submit
the matter for a jury to decide. (R. 390-434).
Following deliberation, the jury returned a verdict (net of offsets) of only
$7,096.00 for Pochynok. See Addendum at No. 4 (R. 354-355). Pochynok did not appeal
the jury verdict, nor did it order a transcript of the trial for inclusion in the record herein.
On May 31,2002, Defendants and Appellees moved the court for an order taxing
costs and attorneys' fees which they had incurred in the litigation. Plaintiff/Appellant
J. Pochynok Company opposed the motion of Defendants and Appellees, and filed its
own motion for an award of costs and fees. Both parties submitted evidence of costs and
attorneys' fees in the form of affidavits by legal counsel.
By minute entry dated July 25,2002 (R. 621-622), the trial court granted
Defendant/Appellees' motion to tax costs and attorneys' fees, and denied
Plaintiff/Appellant's motion. Judgment upon the verdict was thereupon entered by the
Court on August 5,2002 as follows:
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a.

Judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff J. Pochynok Company,

Inc., and against Defendants Gregory Smedsrud and LouAnn Smedsrud,
jointly and severally, in the amount of $7,076.56, together with interest
thereon from and after May 22,2002 until paid in full at the contract rate of
12% per annum.
b.

Judgment was entered in favor of Defendants Gregory and LouAnn

Smedsrud, jointly and severally, and against Plaintiff J. Pochynok
Company, Inc., in the following amounts:
i.

$1,906.94, representing Defendants'costs of suit incurred

priorto May9,2002;
ii.

$48,083.10, representing Defendants' attorneys' fees incurred

prior to May 9,2002;
iii.

$766.50, representing Defendants5 costs of suit incurred on

and after May 9, 2002;
iv.

$33,280.00, representing Defendants' attorneys' fees incurred

on and after May 9,2002; and
v.

Interest was awarded on the foregoing amounts from and after

May 22,2002 until paid in full, at the contract rate of 12%.
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The Judgment further denied Plaintiff/Appellant's petition for foreclosure of its
mechanic's lien against the residence of Defendants/Appellees, holding that
Plaintiff7Appellant held no right, title or interest therein. See Addendum at No. 5
(R. 635-640).
On August 23,2002, Pochynok moved the court for an order altering or amending
the judgment under Rule 59 (e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which was denied by
order of the lower court on October 7,2002 (R. 629-631). Pochynok filed its Notice of
Appeal on November 4,2002. By Order dated December 20,2002 (R. 854-855), this
matter was referred to the Court of Appeals for decision. Following briefing and
argument, the Court of Appeals issued its decision on November 6,2003 (Addendum at
No. 1).
Pochynok petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for certiorari on January 5,2004.
By order dated March 18, 2004, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the sole issue of
whether Smedsruds had properly been deemed the "successful parties" at trial for
purposes of the award of costs and attorney's fees (Addendum at No. 2). On June 1,
2004, Pochynok submitted its brief on Certiorari. On June 30th, the Smedsruds submitted
their Brief on Certiorari. On August 2,2004, Pochynok submitted its Reply Brief.
On June 24,2005, the Supreme Court issued an opinion upholding the Court of
Appeals' use of the flexible and reason approach in its review of the trial courts

750687v2

7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

determination of the "successful party." The Supreme Court recognized that the trial
court should have made findings regarding the amounts sought and awarded by each
party. In addition, the Court indicated that a determination of the successful party under
§38-1-18 should have occurred before the calculation required under subsection (3) and
that any attorneys' fee award under subsection (1) should then be included in the
subsection (3) calculation of whether any offer ofjudgment was greater than the
judgment finally obtained at trial. Finally, the Court remanded to the Court of Appeals
with instruction to remand to the trial court for a factual determination of awards and
offsets, followed by a ruling of who was the successfiil party under Utah Code Ann. § 381-18(1), and whether an award of attorneys' fees under § 38-1-18(3) was proper.
Addendum at No. 2.
On November 15,2005, Pochynok moved the trial court for an order setting aside
the writ of garnishment previously entered, ordering restitution of garnished funds, and
reinstating its mechanic's lien (R. 904-912). The trial court, by order dated February 6,
2006, took Pochynok's motion under advisement and, consistent with the Supreme
Court's directive, requested Pochynok and the Smedsrud to each prepare and submit
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Both parties submitted proposed
findings and conclusions.
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On March 3,2006, the Court signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
submitted by Defendant/Appellees Smedsrud, as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

This matter was tried to a jury on May 21 and 22,2002.

2.
J. Pochynok Company Inc. ("Plaintiff) had filed a complaint
against Gregory Smedsrud and Lou Ann Smedsrud ("Smedsruds") to
foreclose a mechanic's lien asserted for work allegedly performed to the
Smedsruds' residence located at 7100 Canyon Road in Summit County,
State of Utah.
3.
Plaintiffs claims were based upon a Notice of Mechanic's
Lien filed with the Summit County Recorder's office on October 19, 1999,
in the amount of $74,360.51, together with interest, $ 100 in costs and
attorneys' fees. See Exhibit 1 hereto.
4.
Plaintiff had previously filed, and then released, a Notice of
Mechanic's Lien against Defendants' property on July 26,1999 in the
amount of $150,000, plus interest, costs and attorneys' fees. See Exhibit 2.
5.
Plaintiff also brought claims against the Smedsruds for breach
of contract and quantum meruit.
6.
The Smedsruds counterclaimed, asserting defective
workmanship and failure to complete the project r
7.
Pella Products, Inc. had asserted a crossclaim against
Smedsrud; this, however, had been dismissed with prejudice pursuant to
stipulation and prior order of this Court.
8.
In addition, all claims of Plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc.
against Defendants Blaze Wharton Construction, Inc. and Jeffrey Kaiser
were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure prior to trial.
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9.
At trial, Plaintiff asserted a claim against Defendants in the
amount of $81,269.91 (exclusive of costs and attorneys' fees).
10.
Plaintiff offered inconsistent calculations, however, for
money allegedly owed in the computation of its claim. Specifically,
documentary evidence was introduced at trial showing inconsistent
demands by Plaintiff for payment.
11.
In addition, evidence was introduced that Plaintiff had filed
the July 26, 1999 notice of mechanics' lien against Smedsruds' residence at
a time when significant draw requests had recently been paid.
12.
Smedsruds presented evidence challenging Plaintiffs
accounting work, and establishing that Plaintiffs claim at trial, and its
second notice of mechanics' lien, were excessive.
13.
Smedsruds also presented evidence that they were entitled to
significant offsets for unearned supervisor fees, work defects and delays.
Specifically, Smedsruds presented evidence that
a.
Paint work had been double charged, resulting in overcharge of
$23,087.07;
b.
Plaintiff s contractor fee on the paint work overcharged was likewise
unwarranted, resulting in an overcharge of $2,308.71;
c.
Smedsruds had been subjected to unwarranted delay costs of
$3,118.75; and
d.
Plaintiffs lien had been overstated, permitting offset in an amount
equal to twice the overcharge amount, which Smedsruds placed at
$11,535.96.
14.
Smedsruds further produced evidence that they had never received a
consistent accounting from Plaintiff despite nearly three years of negotiations and
attempts, contradictory and inconsistent claims coming from Plaintiff right up to
the eve of trial. Had Plaintiff been willing to discuss a consistent claim in light of

750687v2

10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Defendants' demands and offsets, the case would not have gone to trial; absent a
cogent accounting, though, Defendants had no choice but to submit the matter for
a jury to decide
15.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury returned a general verdict
in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of only $7,076.56.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
With respect to an award of costs and attorneys fees to the
"successful part/' in this action, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1), this
Court is charged with applying a "flexible and reasoned approach" to the parties'
relative successes in establishing their claims at trial -AK&R Whipple Plumbing &
Heating v. Aspen Construction, 2004 Utah 47,ffi[25-26,94 P.3d 270.
2.
At trial, Plaintiff asserted claims exceeding $81,000; Smedsruds,
however (1) challenged the propriety of Plaintiff s accounting and claim, and (2)
asserted an offset claim of $40,050.49, together with accrued judgment interest.
3.
As such, Plaintiff recovered on only a small fraction of its original
claim, which was reduced by a factor even greater than the dollar amount of
Smedsruds' claimed offsets.
4.
The trial court found Smedsruds' challenge to Plaintiffs claim,
coupled with their asserted offsets, more persuasive than Plaintiffs offered
evidence in support of its claim.
5.
The trial court was further persuaded that, had Plaintiff offered an
accurate accounting to Smedsruds, trial by jury might have been averted.
6.
Under these circumstances, the court concludes that Smedsruds
obtained a comparative victory, considering what total victory would have meant
for each of the parties.
7.
The court further concludes that Smedsruds obtained a full
percentage of their claimed offsets.
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8.
Accordingly, the court concludes that Smedsruds were the "successful
party" at trial, for purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1).
9.
In light of the foregoing, the court affirms its prior award of costs and
attorneys fees to Smedsruds, and its prior denial of costs and attorneys fees to
Plaintiff.
10.
In light of the foregoing, the court likewise reaffirms its award of
Smedsruds' costs and attorneys fees incurred after May 9,2002, pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 38-1-18(3), given that Smedsruds' May 9, 2002 Offer of Judgment
was greater than Plaintiffs actual recovery at trial, with or without an award of
costs and attorneys fees under Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1).
11.
The court therefore reaffirms its judgment upon verdict and order on posttrial motions entered August 15,2002, as that order and judgment may hereafter be
supplemented in the amount of any post-judgment costs and attorneys fees
incurred by Smedsruds as may hereafter be established by affidavit. . .
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. 984-992, Addendum at No. 6 l .
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Smedsruds defer to the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, set
out at pp. 8-10, above. As stated therein, and in compliance with Rule 24, Utah R. App.
P., Smedsruds reiterate those facts as follows:
1.

By this action, Plaintiff and Appellant J. Pochynok Company, Inc. sought

an order of the Court foreclosing a mechanic's lien interest in property located at 7100

lf

The record does not contain a separate ruling on Pochynok's Motion to Set Aside
Garnishment, etc., which the Court took under advisement pending submission of
proposed findings and conclusions.
750687v2
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Canyon Road in Summit County, State of Utah, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1, et
seq. See Plaintiffs Amended Lien Foreclosure Complaint herein (R. 200-208).
2.

Pochyno&s-c^ims were based upon a Notice of Mechanic's Lien filed with

the Summit County Recorder's office on October 19,1999, in the amount of $74,360.51,
together with interest, $100 in costs and attorneys' fees (R. 208-402).
3.

Pochynok had previously filed, and then released, a Notice of Mechanic's

Lien against Defendants' property on July 26,1999 in the amount of $ 150,000, plus
interest, costs and attorneys' fees (R. 405).
4.

Defendants' Answer and Counterclaim asserted, inter alia, defective

workmanship and delay damages. See Defendants' Answer to Pochynok's Amended
Lien Foreclosure Complaint and Counterclaim herein (R. 19-29; 211-218).
5.

This matter was set for trial to a jury commencing May 21,2002.

&

On May 9,2002, Defendants submitted to Pochynok, through its counsel,

an offer ofjudgment in the amount of $40,000, tendered pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§38-1-18(3). See Addendum 1 hereto (R. 408-410).
7.

Contrary to Pochynok's groundless, unsupported and false declaration (see

Appellants' Brief at pages 3 and 5), Smedsrud paid no subcontractors after May 9,2002.
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8.

At trial, Pochynok asserted a claim against Defendants in the amount of

$81,269.91 (exclusive of costs and attorneys' fees). See Pochynok's Trial Exhibit 26 (R.
412-431).
9.

During trial, Defendants presented evidence that they were entitled to

significant offsets for unearned supervisor fees, work defects and delays. Defendants
further produced evidence that they had never received a consistent accounting from
Pochynok despite nearly three years of negotiations and attempts, contradictory and
inconsistent claims coming from Pochynok right up to the eve of trial. R. 390-434.
10.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury returned a general verdict in

favor of Pochynok in the amount of only $7,076.56. See Addendum 2 hereto (R. 354355).
11.

Prior to and through May 9,2002, Defendants incurred $ 1,906.94 in costs

and $48,083.10 in attorneys' fees. Affidavit of Ross I. Romero (R. 435-459).
12.

Between May 10,2002 and the entry of judgment, Defendants/Appellees

incurred $775.70 in costs and $33,280.00 in attorneys' fees. Affidavit of Ross I. Romero
(R. 435-459).
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PRIOR OR RELATED APPEALS
Pochynok filed its Notice of Appeal on November 4,2002. By Order dated
December 20,2002, this Court transferred the matter to the Utah Court of Appeals for
disposition (Appeal Number 20020940-CA). Oral argument was presented to the Court
of Appeals on October 16,2003. The Court of Appeal's opinion issued November 6,
2003, affirming the trial court's rulings in all respects (Addendum 4 hereto). Pochynok
petitioned for Writ of Certiorari on January 5,2004, granted by Order of this Court dated
March 18,2004. On June 24,2005 the Supreme Court issued its Opinion remanding the
case to the trial court to enter more specific findings of facts and conclusions of law as to
the awards and offsets as well as who was the successful party.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
ly

Utah Code Ann. §31-1-17:
Except as provided in § 3 8-11 -107, as between the owner and
the contractor, the Court shall apportion the costs according to
the right of the case

2.

Utah Code Ann. §38-1-18(1):
Except as provided in § 38-11-107 and in subsection (2), in
any action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter, the
successful party shall be entitled to recovery a reasonable
attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the Court, which shall be taxed
as costs in the action.
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3.

Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(3):
A party against whom any action is brought to enforce a lien
under this chapter may make an offer ofjudgment pursuant to
Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. If the offer is
not accepted and the judgment finally obtained by the offeree
is not more favorable that the offer, the offeree shall pay the
costs and attorneys' fees incurred by the offerer after the offer
was made.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The trial court in adopting the Smedsruds5 proposed Findings of Facts and
Conclusion of Law found they were the "successful parties," for purposes of Utah Code.
Ann. §38-1-18.
The balancing test mandated by Shupe v. Menlove, 18 Utah 2d 130,417 P.2d 246
(1966), coupled with the "flexible, reasoned approach" to determining the "successful
party," as mandated in the case law handed down since that time, dictate that Smedsruds
were clearly the successful parties in this case. They defeated all but a fraction of
Pochynok's mechanic's lien claims through assertion of rights of setoff. Moreover, given
their statutory entitlement to post-May 9 attorneys' fees, the net recovery in the case goes
in favor of Defendants and Appellees, and renders them the "successful parties" under
any definition.
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ARGUMENT
POINTI
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THE
SMEDSRUDS WERE THE SUCCESSFUL PARTY IN THIS CASE.
The Utah Supreme Court's ruling on certiorari herein expressly adopted the
"flexible and reasoned approach" to determining the "successful party" in a mechanics's
lien action. It acknowledged, moreover, that the trial court could well conclude, upon
proper factual findings, that Smedsrads had been the "successful parties" at trial herein:
"Though [the] insufficiency [of information in the trial court record
concerning the trial court's inference and conclusions] requires that we
direct the court of appeals to remand this case to the trial court for a
determination of awards and offsets, it does not necessarily follow, as
Pochynok contends, that Pochynok is the successful party. Our difficulty is
with the trial court's process, not necessarily the outcome. After a
determination of the awards and offsets likely considered and made by the
jury, it is entirely possible that the trial court might once again conclude that
the Smedsrads are the successful party.
Addendum at No. 2, p. 6.
On remand, the trial court accepted the assignment to enter findings and
conclusions concerning "the awards and offsets likely considered and made by the jury",
and concluded - again - that under the "flexible, reasoned approach" articulated by the
Supreme Court in its order of remand, Smedsrads were the "successful parties".
Addendum at No. 6. While much of what follows is repetitive of prior briefing in this
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case, it established once again the propriety of the trial court's compliance with the
Supreme Court's mandate herein.
A. Attorneys' Fees Incurred After May 9.2002.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(3) provides as follows:
A party against whom any action is brought to enforce a lien
under this chapter may make an offer ofjudgment pursuant to
Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. If the offer is
not accepted and the judgment finally obtained by the offeree
is not more favorable that the offer, the offeree shall pay the
costs and attorneys' fees incurred by the offerer after the offer
was made.2
The language of 38-1-18(3) is mandatory.3 By making their offer of judgment of $40,000
on May 9,2002, Defendants/Appellees became statutorily entitled to a recovery of all
costs and attorneys' fees incurred after that date if Plaintiff/Appellant, as lienholder,
failed to recover more than the amount of the offer at trial. It is undisputed that
Plaintiffs/Appellant's recovery, net of offsets asserted by Defendants/Appellees, was
only a fraction of the offer amount. Without more, then, Defendants and Appellees were
statutorily entitled to an award of costs in the amount of $775.70, and attorneys' fees in
the amount of $33,280,00.

2

Rule 68, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, permits the extension of an offer of
judgment at any time more than 10 days prior to the commencement of trial.
3

That an award of attorneys' fees is a matter of right where provided by statute or
contract, see Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44.
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B. Attorneys' Fees Incurred Prior to May 9.2002.
On remand, the trial court acted well within its discretion in determining, under a
totality of circumstances, that Smedsruds were the "successful parties" at the trial of this
matter, and awarding costs and fees under Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the term "successful party" for purposes of
award costs and attorneys' fees, must be viewed in light of two separate statutory
provisions, which have been interpreted to complement each other. Utah Code Ann.
§ 38-1-18(1) provides as follows:
Except as provided in § 38-11-107 and in subsection (2), in
any action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter, the
successful party shall be entitled to recovery a reasonable
attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the Court, which shall be taxed
as costs in the action.
Utah Code Ann. § 31-1-17, however, reads as follows:
Except as provided in § 38-11-107, as between the owner and
the contractor, the Court shall apportion the costs according to
the right of the case
In the case of Shupe v. Menlove, 18 Utah 2d 130,417 P.2d 246 (1966), the Utah Supreme
Court was faced with a case in which (precisely as in the case before the Court in this
action) a building contractor sought to foreclose a mechanic's lien claim against a
property owner pursuant to a cost-plus-ten-percent building contract. There, as here, the
jury had returned a verdict in favor of the contractor, but for substantially less than the
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amount of the contractor's mechanic's lien claim or the amount asserted at trial. The trial
court rejected the contractor's claim that he had been the "successful party" at trial. This
Court affirmed. In its opinion, the Court quoted the language of § 17 and 18 of the
Mechanic's Lien Statute set out above, and then stated the following:
It is plain that these two sections relating to this subject
should be construed together and that when attorney fees are
awardable thereunder, they are to be treated as costs, which,
as expressed in 38-1-17 the Court 'shall apportion the cost
according to the right of the case.'
417P.2dat249.
More recent cases are in accord. Pochynok has cited AK&R Whipple Plumbing &
Heating v. Guy, 47 P.3d 92 (UT App 2002), for the proposition that a "successful party"
in a mechanic's lien action must be determined by a mechanical, winner-take-all, netrecovery rule. Contrary to this argument, though, the Whipple decision stands for the
proposition that a trial court's determination of who is the "successful (or prevailing)
party" is not a mechanical process at all (unless all claims run one way only); that, where
claims in a civil action run both ways and both parties are to a degree successful, the court
must adopt "a flexible and reasoned approach," taking into consideration the practical and
substantive outcome of the litigation. In fact, the court's opinion, while determining that
"successful party" and "prevailing party" were synonymous terms, expressly noted that:
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we do not suggest that whether a claim is ultimately
determined to be enforceable under the conditions of Section
38-1-18 is not a factor to be considered in determining which
party or parties prevail or are successful.
(47P.3dat95.)
The Whipple decision, moreover, expressly invoked and affirmed the Court of
Appeals' decision in Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Savings Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217 (Ut.
Ct. App. 1990), the holding which expressly validates the Court's ruling in this action.
In Occidental, the plaintiff brought a trust deed deficiency action against the Defendant,
seeking also an award of costs and attorneys' fees (in that case under Utah Code Ann.
§ 57-1-32). The trial court observed that, of its six-figure deficiency claim, the plaintiff
recovered only $7,339.44. Based thereon, the trial court determined that, even though
plaintiff obtained a judgment against Defendants, they were the "prevailing parties" by
reason of the nominal amount thereof, and awarded them costs and attorneys' fees. The
court of appeals affirmed:
At trial, Occidental obtained a judgment of approximately
$7300. It argues that a money judgment in its favor entitles it
to attorneys' fees as the prevailing party. As stated above, this
court has recognized the needfor a flexible and reasoned
approach to making determinations of who is the prevailing
party. .
In the case at hand, Occidental claimed a balance due of over
$600,000 resulting from the trustee's sale held in April 1986.
. . . The Mehrs were successful in defending against
Occidental's claim for a $600,000 deficiency based on the
April sale. The Mehrs successfully demonstrated the validity
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of the December sale, thus the deficiency judgment was for
the stipulated amount of $7339.44. In light of the
circumstances involved and the issues contested at trial, the
trial court did not err in granting the Mehrs attorneys' fees
and costs as the prevailing party.
791 P. 2d at 222. In Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Savings, then, as in the instant case, the
trial court sustained an award of attorneys' fees to a party which successfully defeated all
but a token amount of the opposing party's claim. Occidental directly defeats the claim
of Plaintiff in this action to the effect that any award of a money judgment automatically
entitles the recipient to the status of "prevailing party," and to an award of attorneys' fees
as a matter of law. Rather, the Court must look to the realities of the case, and adopt the
Court of Appeals' "flexible and reasoned approach" to an award of attorneys' fees.
Under the Occidental/Nebraska decision, as affirmed in Whipple, the Court's ruling in
this action should stand.
Finally, the "flexible and reasoned approach" dictated by Occidental and Whipple
was affirmed and expanded in the recent Utah Supreme Court decision of R.T. Nielson
Company v. Cook 2002 UT 11,2002 Utah LEXIS 16 (Utah 2002):
As the court of appeals noted in Mountain States
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, determining the prevailing party
for purposes of awarding fees can often times be quite simple.
783 P.2d 551, 555 (Ut 1989). Where a plaintiff sues for
money damages, and plaintiff wins, plaintiff is the prevailing
party; if defendant successfully defends and avoids adverse
judgment, defendant has prevailed. Id. This simple analysis
cannot always be employed, however
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Which party is the prevailing party is an appropriate question
for the trial court. This question depends, to a large measure,
on the context of each case, and, therefore, it is appropriate to
leave this determination to the sound discretion of the trial
court. We therefore review the trial court's determination as to
who was the prevailing party under an abuse of discretion
standard. Appropriate considerations for the trial court would
include, but are not limited to, (1) contractual language, (2)
the number of claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, etc.,
brought by the parties, (3) the importance of the claims
relative to each other and their significance in the context of
the lawsuit considered as a whole, and (4) the dollar amounts
attached to and awarded in connection with the various
claims. Based on these and other relevant factors, the trial
court is in a better position than we are as an appellate court
to decide which party is the prevailing party. In most cases
involving language similar to the contractual language before
us here, there can generally be only one prevailing party.
[Citations omitted] However, the standard articulated above
will permit a case-by-case evaluation by the trial court, and
flexibility to handle circumstances where both, or neither,
parties may be considered to have prevailed.
2002 Utah Lexis at 25.
In this action, the "right of the case" plainly dictated that Defendants and
Appellees Gregory and Louann Smedsrud be deemed the "successful parties" for
purposes of an award of costs and attorneys' fees, and the trial court so found. Under the
R.T. Nielson standard, as well as that in Occidental and Whipple, the trial court's
determination was clearly the correct outcome, and should not be disturbed.
Pochynok's recovery on its ever-changing mechanic's lien claim amounted to less
than 10% of its pleaded claim amount, and barely 8% of its asserted amount at trial. The
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jury, as trier of fact, must be presumed persuaded that Pochynok's claim was not only
excessive, but should be all but eclipsed by Smedsruds' claimed offsets.
It was Pochynok's inability, and unwillingness, to furnish a consistent accounting
on the project which necessitated adjudication of this matter to begin with. Smedsruds
tried repeatedly, both before and after completion of the project, to persuade Mr.
Pochynok to sit down with them and resolve the account. Rather than do so, Pochynok
simply made repeated demands for payment, the amount of the demand changing each
time (often several times in the course of only a few days). Not only were the numbers
inconsistent, but none would acknowledge a single penny of offset for improper work or
delays.
The language of Whipple, mandating a "flexible, reasoned approach" to
determining the "successful party" in attorneys' fee awards has specific application to this
case, where Smedsruds offered judgment for nearly six times Plaintiffs ultimate
recovery, and thus became entitled as a matter of law to all attorneys' fees incurred after
May 9,2002 (the sum total of which far eclipsed Plaintiffs jury verdict). While Whipple
rejected the strict "net recovery" rule in cases where (as here), both parties realize on
claims, Smedsruds' statutory entitlement to post-May 9 attorneys' fees clearly dictates a
net balance in their favor. Certainly, under the "flexible and reasoned approach"
mandated by Whipple, the court's decision in this case is unassailable.
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Any practical application of the principles set out in the decision of Shupe v.
Menlove, dictates that, apportioning costs and attorneys' fees between owners and
contract "according to the right of the case" dictates that Smedsruds - not J. Pochynok
Company - were the "successful party/' and should be awarded their costs and attorneys'
fees.

As noted above, moreover, J. Pochynok Company filed two successive liens

against SmedsrudsVAppellees' property in connection with its claims in this matter. The
first, for $150,000, was released not long after its filing; the second, for some $74,000,
remained pending through trial. Yet the jury's verdict - clearly applying Smedsruds'
offset claims - was for just over $7,000 total. Both notices of lien were for amounts far
in excess of that which J. Pochynok Company was ultimately entitled. The purpose of the
liens' filing was to secure payment to Pochynok for an amount greater than that actually
owing.
Under Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25, the filing of an excessive lien under the
circumstances set out above constitutes a misdemeanor.4 It is self-evident that, in taxing

4

Since this action was filed, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25 has been amended to
permit a right of civil recovery for wrongful lien filing. In addition, Utah Code Ann.
§38-1-18(2) has been added since the filing of this action, statutorily denying to a
mechanic's lien claimant the right to recover any attorneys' fees whatever in the event
that its lien filing is adjudged wrongful. While these provisions were not in effect at the
time Pochynok's notices of mechanic's liens were filed in this action, they plainly
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costs (including attorneys' fees) "according to the right of the case," as mandated by Utah
Code Ann. § 38-1-17 and Shupe v. Menlove, the Court could take into account the fact
that the mechanics lien which Pochynok sought to vindicate by this action (as well as its
predecessor) were shown at trial to be excessive, wrongful and illegal on their face.
Under such circumstances, Smedsruds and Appellees were properly awarded their
attorneys'fees as the "successful parties."
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO SET ASIDE THE
GARNISHMENT OF POCHYNOK'S ACCOUNT AND REINSTATE
POCHYNOK'S MECHANICS LIEN.
This matter was remanded to the trial court for one purpose only: to enter findings
and conclusions assessing "the awards and offsets likely considered and made by the
jury" at trial, in order to revisit the question of whether Smedsruds were the "successful
parties" at trial (Addendum at No. 2, p. 6). Pochynok's prior challenge to the postjudgment garnishment of its bank account was unsuccessful before this Court, and was
not accepted for review under the Supreme Court's writ of certiorari (Id. At p. 1). As
such, it was not properly before the trial court at all, and not reviewable here. The Utah
Supreme Court's ruling remanded for a factual determination of awards and offsets,

codified what was already clear in the law - that the pursuit of excessive mechanic's liens
is contrary to public policy.
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followed by a ruling on who is the successful party and (if appropriate) a determination of
attorney fees. In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the trial Court's use
of the "flexible and reasoned approach" for determining the successful party. The
Supreme Court did not instruct the trial court to order the attorneys fees and costs to be
returned, rather, it sought only clarification from the trial court for its order. Indeed, as
addressed at length in the Supreme Court's opinion, it expressly rejected Pochynok's
claim that it was the "successful party," deferring this question to the trial court upon
more explicit findings of fact.
There is some question, moreover, whether any final ruling exists in the record on
Pochynok's motion from which an appeal can be taken. The motion was taken under
advisement by the trial court's minute entry ruling of February 6,2006 (R. 950), and
never thereafter addressed on the record of the trial court. The claim, strictly speaking,
may be unappealable.
As a practical matter, however, the motion on garnishment issues has been
rendered moot, for purposes of this appeal, by the trial court's findings and conclusions
(Addendum at No. 6). An issue on appeal is "moot" whenever the requested relief cannot
affect the rights of the litigants - State v. Rivera, 954 P. 2d 225 (Utah 1997). At the time
the motion was made, the trial court had already determined that Smedsruds were the
"successful parties", entitled to recovery of costs and fees. The trial court's reaffirmation
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of that finding upon remand mooted any interim claim of impropriety of the garnishment
proceeding. Given the trial court's proper carrying out of the Supreme Court's mandate
(with the same result), Pochynok cannot claim injury by reason of the garnishment Smedsruds remain entitled to the garnished funds.
Neither did Pochynok's demand for restitution of garnished funds have merit at the
time it was raised before the trial court. Pochynok cites the case of Baca v. Hoover,
Backs & Shearer, 823 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist] 1992, writ denied) to
support its proposition that garnished funds should be returned to Pochynok. The Baca
decision, however, presents a very different factual scenario. Therein, a judgment
underlying a garnishee judgment was dismissed - not remanded for further proceedings.
Given this situation, the Texas Court of Appeals properly ruled that the garnishment was
inappropriate:
A garnishment is not an original suit, but ancillary to the main one, and for
that reason takes its jurisdiction from the main suit, [citations omitted]
Thus, when the trial court loses jurisdiction in the main suit by reason of an
appeal, it likewise loses jurisdiction in the ancillary garnishment
proceeding, [citation omitted] If the judgment in the main suit is affirmed,
the trial court regains jurisdiction over the garnishment action. . . if the
judgment in the main suit is reversed, the garnishment proceedings become
a nullity and the writs issued thereunder are functus officio* or of no further
force or authority.
823 SW.2d at 738 (emphasis added). Smedsruds certainly acknowledge that, given the
Supreme Court's ruling, the trial Court regained jurisdiction of both the underlying cause
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of action and the garnishment action. The underlying judgment, however, was not
reversed and vacated by the remand; rather, the trial Court was charged with the taking of
further proceedings in the form of factual findings sufficient to sustain its conclusion that,
in fact, Smedsruds were the "successful party," and entitled to their costs and fees by law.
Pending that determination, the ancillary garnishment proceeding (of which the trial
Court likewise regained jurisdiction) was held in abeyance.
Pochynok's request that the trial Court reinstate its mechanic's lien was and
remains a mystery. Nowhere in the Supreme Court's opinion was such relief mandated, or
even implied. Indeed, it seems to contemplate the outcome of the mandated factual
findings in Pochynok's favor before findings have even been made, an approach which
the Supreme Court's decision expressly forbad. In fact, Pochynok took no appeal from
this Court's order releasing its claim of mechanic's lien. Decisions of the trial court from
which no appeal was taken are preserved and remain in full force and effect, unaffected
by any portions of the trial court's decision reversed or remanded pursuant to appeal.
See, Bailey-Allen Company, Inc. v. Kurzet, 945 P.2d 180 (Utah App. 1997) ("any portion
of a judgment not appealed from continues in effect, regardless of the reversal of other
parts of the judgment"-945 P.2d at 194).
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CONCLUSION
Pochynok's essential argument is simple: He asserted a claim of nearly $100,000,
yet walked away from trial with a recovery (net of Smedsruds' asserted offsets) of less
than $8,000. Nevertheless, Pochynok claims, he was the "successful party" simply
because Smedsruds did not succeed in extinguishing his claim altogether.
Case precedent from both this Court and the Court of Appeals has long since
debunked such a mechanical approach to determining who is the "successful party" in
multi-claim construction litigation. The Utah Legislature has required that costs
(including fees) be apportioned "according to the right of the case." Case law has
repeatedly mandated a "flexible, reasoned approach."
The nature of the claims and counterclaims asserted by the parties, the accounting
information which was included in the record, and the jury's resulting verdict, paint a fair
picture: Pochynok severely abused a contractor's legal lien rights in this case, and was not
successful in vindicating its conduct. This position was supported in the Court entering
the Findings of Facts and Conclusion of law submitted by the Smedsruds.
Add to the foregoing the fact of Smedsruds' May 9,2002 offer ofjudgment, in an
amount more than five times Pochynok's ultimate verdict, and the trial court's
discretionary award of attorneys' fees to Smedsruds becomes even more compelling.
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Based on the foregoing, it is submitted that the Court correctly found the
Smedsrads were the successful party and that the garnishment was proper as well as the
denial of Pochynok's mechanic's lien.
DATED this^)

day of July, 2006,
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC

Vincent C. Rampton
Rossi. Romero
Attorneys for Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrad
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on thgZ-J gay of July, 2006,1 caused to be mailed by first
class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLEES'
BRIEF to the following:
Ray G. Martineau
Anthony R. Martineau
Brett D. Cragun
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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80P.3d563
80 P.3d 563,486 Utah Adv. Rep. 27,2003 UT App 375
(Cite as: 80 P.3d 563,2003 UT App 375)

Court of Appeals of Utah.
J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Gregory SMEDSRUD; Louann Smedsrud;
Butterfield Lumber, Inc., a corporation;
Pella Products, Inc., a corporation; et al.,
Defendants and Appellees.
No. 20020940-CA.
Nov. 6,2003.
Contractor brought action against homeowners,
seeking to foreclose a mechanics* lien and to
recover for breach of contract, and homeowners
counterclaimed for breach of contract. The District
Court, Salt Lake Department, J. Dennis Frederick,
J., entered judgment for contractor, but awarded
costs and attorney fees to homeowners. Contractor
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings, Associate
Presiding Judge, held that: (1) homeowners were
"successful party" and, thus, entitled to award of
attorney fees and costs, and (2) funds in contractor's
business account were subject to garnishment.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
[1] Mechanics* Liens €=>309
257k309 Most Cited Cases
Appellate court reviews a trial court's determination
as to who was the prevailing party, for purposes of
determining entitlement to attorney fees, in action to
enforce a mechanics' lien, under an abuse of
discretion standard. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-18(1).
[2] Appeal and Error €==>842(1)
30k842(l) Most Cited Cases
Whether an amended statute operates retroactively
is a question of law, which appellate court reviews
for correctness without deference to the trial court.

[3] Appeal and Error €==>1008.1(5)
30kl008.1(5) Most Cited Cases
Appellate review of factual findings is highly
deferential, requiring reversal only if a finding is
clearly erroneous.
[4] Mechanics' Liens €=>310(1)
257k310(1) Most Cited Cases
Homeowners were "successful party" in contractor's
action to enforce a mechanics' lien, and thus
homeowners were entitled to award of attorney fees
and costs, even though contractor obtained
judgment for $7,076.56, where contractor did not
accept homeowners' offer to settle for $40,000,
contractor recovered only ten percent of amount
initially sought, and it was reasonable to conclude
that jury found in favor of homeowners on their
counterclaims and offset those damages from
contractor's initial claim. U.C.A.1953, 38-1- 18(1).
[5] Appeal and Error €=>1024.1
30kl024.1 Most Cited Cases
Because prevailing party status depends, to a large
measure, on the context of each case, the trial court
is in a better position than an appellate court is to
decide which party is the prevailing party for
purposes of determining entitlement to attorney fees.
[6] Garnishment €=?56
189k56 Most Cited Cases
Funds in contractor's business account were subject
to garnishment, even though contractor intended to
use such funds to pay subcontractors; use of funds
was solely in discretion of contractor.
[7] Banks and Banking C==>154(6)
52kl54(6) Most Cited Cases
[7] Banks and Banking €^227(1)
52k227(l) Most Cited Cases
There is a rebuttable presumption that the funds in a
bank account belong to the account owner.
*564 Brett D. Cragun, Ray G. Martineau, and
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FN1. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-1 to 29
(2001 & Supp.2003).

Vincent C. Rampton and Ross I. Romero, Jones
Waldo Holbrook & McDonough, Salt Lake City,
for Appellees.

FN2. In 2001, the Utah Legislature
amended Utah's mechanics' liens statute to
include a provision governing offers of
judgment in mechanics' lien disputes. See
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(3) (2001). The
amendment became effective on April 30,
2001, after Pochynok filed its complaint,
but before the Smedsruds filed their May
9, 2002 offer of judgment. See id.
(Amendment Notes).

Anthony R.
Appellant.

Martineau,

Salt Lake

City,

Before JACKSON, P.J., BILLINGS, Associate P.J.
and GREENWOOD, J.

OPINION
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
**1 Pochynok Company, Inc. (Pochynok) appeals
the trial couif s posttrial order awarding costs and
attorney fees to Gregory and Louann Smedsrud (the
Smedsruds) and upholding garnishment of
Pochynok's account at Zions First National Bank
over its objections. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
**2 In August 1998, Pochynok and the Smedsruds
entered into a construction contract wherein
Pochynok agreed to build a residence for the
Smedsruds in Summit County and in return the
Smedsruds agreed to pay Pochynok for his services
as a general contractor. On January 13, 2000,
Pochynok filed a complaint against the Smedsruds
alleging breach of contract arising from the
Smedsruds1 failure to pay $81,269.91 for services
rendered. Pursuant to the Utah mechanics' liens
statute, [FN1] Pochynok sought to foreclose a
mechanics' lien on the Smedsruds' Summit County
property to recover the unpaid amounts. The
Smedsruds counterclaimed for breach of the same
construction
contract
alleging
defective
workmanship, delay damages, and failure to
supervise. On May 9, 2002, pursuant to rule 68 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah Code
Annotated section 38-1-18(3) (2001), [FN2] the
*565 Smedsruds submitted an offer of judgment in
the amount of $40,000, which Pochynok did not
accept. A jury trial ensued in late-May 2002. At
the conclusion of trial, the jury rendered a verdict
awarding $7,076.56 to Pochynok. [FN3]

FN3. The verdict form does not indicate
what damages, if any, were awarded to the
Smedsruds to offset Pochynock's claimed
damages of $81,269.91.
**3 Thereafter, both Pochynok and the Smedsruds
filed posttrial motions claiming to be the
"successful party" for purposes of the mechanics'
liens statute, and requesting costs and attorney fees.
In addition, the Smedsruds asserted that under
section 38-1-18(3), they were entitled to costs and
attorney fees incurred after May 9, 2002, because
Pochynok did not accept the Smedsruds' offer of
judgment, which was more favorable than the
subsequent jury award for Pochynok.
**4 The trial court determined the Smedsruds
were the successful party under the mechanics' liens
statute, and accordingly granted the Smedsruds'
motion to tax costs and attorney fees to Pochynok.
Concurrently, the trial court ordered Pochynok to
pay the Smedsruds $49,990.04 in costs and attorney
fees incurred prior to May 9, 2002, and $34,046.50
in costs and attorney fees incurred after May 9,
2002, for a total award of $84,036.54.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[1][2] **5 First, Pochynok claims the trial court
erred in determining the Smedsruds were the
"successful party" under the amended mechanics'
liens statute. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1) (2001).
"We ... review the trial court's determination as to
who was the prevailing party under an abuse of
discretion standard." R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook,
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2002 UT ll,f 25, 40 P.3d 1119. Pochynok also
asserts the trial court erred in giving retroactive
effect to subsection 3 of Utah's mechanics* liens
statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(3). "
'Whether
a[n
amended]
statute
operates
retroactively is a question of law, which we review
for correctness without deference to the [trial]
court.' " State Dep't of Human Servs. v. Jacoby,
1999 UT App 52,t 7, 975 P.2d 939 (quoting
Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v. State Tax
Comm'nf 953 P.2d 435,437 (Utah 1997)).
[3] **6 Finally, Pochynok claims the trial court
erred in finding Pochynok's business account funds
were not exempt from garnishment. See Utah R.
Civ. P. 64D(h)(iii). "Appellate review [of factual
findings] is highly deferential, requiring reversal
only if a finding is clearly erroneous." Drake v.
State Indus. Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah
1997).
ANALYSIS
I. "Successful Party" Under Section 38-1-18(1) of
the Mechanics' Liens
Statute
**7 As the sole beneficiary of the jury verdict of
$7,076.56, Pochynok claims to be the successful
party under Utah Code Annotated section 38-118(1) (2001). Hence, Pochynok argues the trial
court erred in awarding costs and attorney fees to
the Smedsruds. Subsection 1 of the mechanics'
liens statute provides that "in any action brought to
enforce any lien under this chapter the successful
party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable
attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall
be taxed as costs in the action." Utah Code Ann. §
38-1-18(1).
**8 Utah courts describe a "successful party"
under the mechanics' liens statute as the "party in
whose favor a judgment is rendered ... the
'prevailing party.' " A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing &
Heating v. Guy, 2002 UT App 73,t 11, 47 P.3d 92
(Whipple II) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1145
(7th ed.1999)), cert, granted, 2002 Utah LEXIS
187, 59 P.3d 603. However, the successful or
prevailing party "may [be] the party who defended
against the lien." Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet,

876 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (citing *566
Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297, 452
P.2d 325, 327-28 (1969)); see also Whipple II,
2002 UT App 73 at J 9, 47 P.3d 92 ("A successful
party includes, but is not limited to., one who
successfully enforces or defends against a lien
action.").
**9 Utah appellate courts "have addressed
[various] methodologies for determining which
party or parties ... occupy prevailing party status"
under the circumstances of a particular case.
Whipple II, 2002 UT App 73 at 1 12, 47 P.3d 92.
Citing to Whipple II, Pochynok contends that the
trial court should have employed a "net recovery"
or "net judgment" analysis to determine the
successful
party
in this case. Pochynok
misconstrues our reasoning in Whipple II and
ignores our holding in that case. The facts
underlying Whipple II are detailed in A.K. & R.
Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr.,
1999 UT App 87, 977 P.2d 518 (Whipple I). The
case involved a plaintiff subcontractor who
obtained a trial judgment for $3,943.00 and an
order allowing foreclosure on three mechanics' liens
against the defendant general contractor. See id. at
K 1, 977 P.2d 518. Determining the plaintiff was
the successful party under the mechanics' liens
statute, the trial court awarded the plaintiff
$7,500.00 in attorney fees. See id at f 9, 977 P.2d
518.
**10 On appeal however, we vacated a portion of
the trial court's order because the plaintiff was not
properly licensed to perform some of the work for
which it obtained judgment. See id. at Iffi 12, 21,
977 P.2d 518. In light of our disposition of the
judgment, we also remanded the attorney fees issue
"for a redetermination of the prevailing party and a
proper allocation of attorney fees to that party." Id.
atf40,977P.2d518.
**11 On remand, the trial court denied the
plaintiffs claim for foreclosure on the mechanics'
lien relating to the work the plaintiff was not
licensed to complete. See Whipple II, 2002 UT
App 73 at f 5, 47 P.3d 92. Based on the plaintiffs
resulting net recovery, the trial court determined
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that the "outcome was essentially a 'draw* " and
concluded neither party prevailed for purposes of
awarding attorney fees under the mechanics' liens
statute. Id.
**12 On appeal for the second time, the defendant
argued that because the trial court's calculations on
remand resulted in a $527.00 net recovery for the
defendant, the trial court should have awarded the
defendant attorney fees as the successful party
under the mechanics* liens statute. See id. at %%
5-6, 47 P.3d 92. Like Pochynok, the defendant
argued the trial court's
successful
party
determination should have been wholly based on a
net recovery analysis. See id. at f 10, 47 P.3d 92.
This court was not persuaded. Noting that "[t]he
facts
and
circumstances
surrounding
a
determination of prevailing party status vary
widely," we declared "the 'net recovery rule' is
[merely] a starting point and need not be applied
strictly" to every prevailing party determination. Id.
at f t 18, 20, 47 P.3d 92. We directed Utah
courts to employ " 'a flexible and reasoned
approach to deciding in particular cases who
actually is the prevailing party.' " Id at % 15, 47
P.3d 92 (quoting Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav.
Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 221 (Utah
Ct.App.1990)). Furthermore, "[a] key part of the
flexible approach" involves using "common sense"
to "look[ ] at the amounts actually sought and then
balanc [e] them proportionally with what was
recovered." Id. at f 19, 791 P.2d 217. On this
reasoning we affirmed the trial court's determination
that neither party was the successful party under the
mechanics' liens statute. See id. at \ 21, 791 P.2d
217.
**13 Two other Utah cases, neither decided under
the mechanics' liens statute, are instructive. In
Mountain States Broadcasting Company v. Neale,
783 P.2d 551 (Utah Ct.App.1989), we applied the
net judgment rule to determine that a party who
obtained an $85,000 net recovery-about 60% of the
amount sought~was the successful party for
purposes of a contractual fee shifting provision.
See id. at 556, 558. However, we cautioned that
when making a successful party determination, a
trial court should only apply the net judgment rule

when doing so "does not distort the relative success
of the parties at trial." Id. at 558. We further
cautioned that "nothing in our opinion should be
taken to suggest that the net judgment rule can be
mechanically applied in all cases." *567 Id. at 557.
In some cases, we held, the net judgment rule is
merely "a good starting point" in a much more
"flexible and reasoned approach to deciding in
particular cases who actually is the prevailing
party," id. (quotations omitted), such as "where the
ultimate award of money damages does not
adequately represent the actual success of the
parties under the peculiar posture of the case." Id.
at 556 n. 7 (citing Owen Jones & Sons, Inc. v. C.R.
Lewis Co., 497 P.2d 312,313-14 (Alaska 1972)).
**14 In Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings
Bank, this court made a prevailing party
determination in a case arising under Utah's real
estate conveyances statute. See id. at 221-22 (citing
Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-1- 24, -32 (1974)). These
statutes (1) empower a trust deed trustee to sell trust
property if the trustor breaches a secured obligation
and (2) award costs and attorney fees to the
prevailing party in any action to recover the balance
due upon the obligation for which the trust deed
was given as security. See id. at 219, 221. In
Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank, the
plaintiff brought an action to recover a remaining
balance of over $600,000. See id. at 222. The trial
court awarded costs and attorney fees to the
defendant as the prevailing party because the
plaintiff recovered only about $7,300 of the
$600,000 amount at trial. See id. On appeal, the
plaintiff, like Pochynok, argued the trial court
should have applied the net recovery rule and
declared the plaintiff the prevailing party by virtue
of the jury award in the plaintiffs favor. See id. at
222. Rejecting this argument, this court applied the
" 'flexible and reasoned approach' " as outlined in
the Mountain States Broadcasting Company case.
See Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank,
791 P.2d at 221 (quoting Mountain States
Broadcasting Co., 783 P.2d at 556 n. 7). As such,
we affirmed the trial court's determination that the
defendant was the successful party where the
defendant prevailed on the only contested issue at
trial-the deficiency amount. See id. at 222.
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[4][5] **15 We, like the trial judge in this case,
are persuaded that an application of the net
judgment rule in the case before us, "distorts] the
relative success of the parties at trial," Mountain
States Broadcasting Co., 783 P.2d at 558, and is
therefore inappropriate. Instead, like the Whipple II
court, we apply a flexible and reasoned approach.
See Whipple IIy 2002 UT App 73,fl 19, 21, 47
P.3d 92. Furthermore, because prevailing party
status "depends, to a large measure, on the context
of each case, ... the trial court is in a better position
than we are as an appellate court to decide which
party is the prevailing party." R.T. Niels on Co. v.
Cook, 2002 UT 1 l,f 25,40 P.3d 1119.
**16 Pochynok initially sought to recover over
$80,000 from the Smedsruds. At trial, a jury
determined that Pochynok's claim was only worth
$7,076.56. Thereupon, the trial court properly
recognized that Pochynok's action, against which
the Smedsruds had no choice but to defend, only
produced a net recovery of approximately 10% of
the amount Pochynok initially sought.
**17 Here, the jury's verdict form does not
provide precise calculations of offsets the jury may
have made for the Smedsruds' counterclaims for
faulty workmanship, delay damages, and improper
supervision. However, from the verdict, the trial
court could have reasonably inferred such offsets by
simply subtracting the jury's verdict of $7,076.56
from the $81,269.91 that Pochynok sought to
recover in the lien enforcement action. The trial
court could have reasonably concluded that the jury
in fact found in favor of the Smedsruds on their
counterclaims and offset these damages in the
amount of $74,193.35 from Pochynok's initial claim.
**18 Furthermore, the mechanics' liens statute was
amended in 2001 to specify the prevailing party
where a proper offer of settlement is made. See
Utah Code Ann. § 39-1-18(3) (2001) (Amendment
Notes). An examination of the effects of subsection
3 is relevant to determining who is a successful
party under section 38-1-18(1). The legislative
history of subsection 3 indicates as much. Under
the title, "Penalty for Wrongful Mechanics Lien,"
Senate Bill 167 proposed amendments to three

sections of the Utah Code: sections 38-1- 18, -25;
and section 58-55-501, in an effort to curb
wrongful, outrageous, and fraudulent lien claims.
See S.B. 167, 2001 Leg., 53d Sess. (Utah 2001).
*568 A note, proposing the amendment adding
subsection 3 and speaking to the bill's intent, is
instructive.
In my view, the primary inequity in the
mechanic's [sic] lien law as it currently operates is
that a party can assert a claim for much more than
he or she is legitimately owed forcing a defendant
to litigate the claim, and yet still be entitled to
attorney[ ] fees as the "prevailing parly" even if
the lien claimant only recovers a fraction of what
was originally claimed.
**19 While the note envisions a simple definition
of successful party, it is clear the intent of the
amendment is to discourage outrageous lien claims
and to encourage the settlement of lawsuits which
are of minor financial value. Thus, we think the
trial court's consideration of the refused offer of
judgment in this case was appropriate in its
successful party determination.
**20 Given the potential for a distorted
determination of the relative success of the parties
by application of the net judgment rule to the facts
of this case, we conclude the trial court wisely
applied a more flexible and reasoned approach to its
successful party determination. Thus, we conclude
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding
the Smedsruds were the successful party under the
mechanics' liens statute and affirm the trial court's
award of $84,036.54 in attorney fees and costs.
[FN4]
FN4. Although we need not reach the
issue, we would hold that LFtah Code
Annotated section 38-1-18(3) (2001),
which was enacted after Pochynok filed its
complaint in this matter, is procedural and
thus applies in this case. Therefore, the
Smedsruds alternatively could recover
attorney fees from the date of their offer of
judgment under subsection 3. Subsection 3
provides:
A party against whom any action is
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brought to enforce a [mechanics'] lien ...
may make an offer of judgment pursuant to
[r]ule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure [and i]f the offer is not accepted
and the judgment finally obtained by the
offeree is not more favorable than the
offer, the offeree shall pay the costs and
attorney[ ] fees incurred by the offeror
after the offer was made.
Id.§ 38-1-18(3).
To determine whether an amendment is
substantive or procedural, we must
examine whether or not the amendment
"establishes a primary right and duty which
was not in existence at the time [the claim]
arose." Johansen v. Johansen, 2002 UT
App 75,K 5, 45 P.3d 520 (alteration in
original)
(quotations
and
citations
omitted).
Under the prior version of the statute, trial
courts were already vested with discretion
to award costs and attorney fees to one
party or the other (i.e., the successful
party) depending on the outcome of the
dispute. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18
(1997). Thus the amendment merely
"provid[es] a different mode or form of
procedure" for courts to employ in
enforcing previously existing substantive
rights and duties. Pilcher v. Department of
Soc. Servs., 663 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 1983)
(deeming a child support enforcement
statute procedural and giving it retroactive
effect even though it was enacted ten years
after the support order); see Utah Code
Ann. § 38-1-18(3) (2001). Authority from
other jurisdictions supports a conclusion
that attorney fee awards are procedural and
can be applied retroactively. See
McCormack v. Town of Granite, 913 P.2d
282, 285 (Okla.1996); Vloedman v.
Cornell, 161 Or.App. 396, 984 P.2d 906,
909(1999).
II. Garnishment
[6] [7] **21 Pochynok also argues the trial court
erred in finding the funds in Pochynok's company
business bank account were not exempt from

garnishment by the Smedsruds where Pochynok
claimed the fbnds did not belong to Pochynok.
[FN5] In Utah, there is a rebuttable presumption
that the funds in a bank account belong to the
account owner. See Peterson v. Peterson, 571 P.2d
1360, 1362 (Utah 1977). Hence, to avoid
garnishment, a garnishee account owner must show
by clear and convincing evidence that the funds
belong to someone else. See id. The record reflects
that Pochynok requested a hearing to claim an
exemption to garnishment pursuant to Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 64(D)(h). However, the record
also reveals that prior to and during the hearing,
Pochynok failed to present any evidence to the trial
court in support of its claim of exemption. With no
competent evidence to counter the Smedsruds'
position, the trial court did not clearly err in finding
the funds were subject to garnishment. [FN6]
FN5. Pochynok utterly failed to marshal
the evidence in challenging the trial court's
factual findings. See West Valley City v.
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315
(Utah Ct.App.1991). For efficiency, we
reach the merits of the claim
notwithstanding.
FN6. Pochynok argues that the parties put
on proof by proffer. However, even given
the proffers made, we conclude the trial
court did not err. Pochynok's argument
that the funds in the account were not
subject to garnishment because those
monies were intended to be used to pay
subcontractors on other projects is without
merit. The funds, once in Pochynok's
account, were owned by Pochynok. Thus,
the decision to pay subcontractors with
those funds, or to use the money
elsewhere, was solely in the discretion of
Pochynok. Under these facts no
constructive trust arises. See Parks v.
Zions First Nat'l Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 599
(Utah 1983) ("Constructive trusts include
all those instances in which a trust is raised
... for the purpose of working out justice in
the most efficient manner, where there is
no intention of the parties to create such a
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relation, and in most cases contrary to the
intention of the one holding the legal title
").
*569 CONCLUSION
**22 We conclude that the trial court did not err in
determining the Smedsruds were the successful
party under the mechanics' liens statute and
awarding the Smedsruds attorney fees and costs.
We also conclude the court did not err in
determining the funds in Pochynok's company bank
account were subject to garnishment by the
Smedsruds. We affirm the trial court's award of
costs and attorney fees to the Smedsruds and the
garnishment of Pochynok's company account.
**23 WE CONCUR: NORMAN H. JACKSON,
Presiding Judge, PAMELA T. GREENWOOD,
Judge.
80 P.3d 563, 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 2003 UT
App 375
END OF DOCUMENT
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Supreme Court of Utah.
J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., A
Corporation, Plaintiff and Petitioner,
v.
Gregory SMEDSRUD and LouAnn Smedsrud,
Defendants and Respondents.
No. 20040005.
June 24,2005.
Background: General contractor brought action
against homeowners, seeking to foreclose
mechanics1 lien and to recover for breach of
contract, and homeowners counterclaimed for
breach of contract. Following a jury trial, the Third
District Court, Salt Lake Department, J. Dennis
Frederick, J., entered judgment for general
contractor, but awarded costs and attorney fees to
homeowners. General contractor appealed. The
Court of Appeals, 80 P.3d 563, affirmed.
Contractor sought certiorari review, which was
granted.
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Durham, C.J.,
held that:
(1)
flexible-and-reasoned
approach,
not
net-judgment rule, applied when determining which
party was "successful party" for purposes of
awarding attorney fees;
(2) remand was warranted for purpose of
determining whether general contractor or
homeowners were entitled to award of attorney fees;
and
(3) as a matter of first impression, determination of
the "successful party" under statute requiring court:
to award attorney fees to successful party should
occur before calculation concerning offer of
judgment.
Decision of Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded.
West Headnotes

[1] Certiorari C==>64(1)
73k64(l) Most Cited Cases
On certiorari, Supreme Court review the decision of
the Court of Appeals, not the decision of the trial
court.
[2] Appeal and Error €==>842(1)
30k842(l) Most Cited Cases
When reviewing attorney fee decisions that involve
questions of law, Supreme Court reviews for
correctness.
[3] Appeal and Error €=^842(1)
30k842(l) Most Cited Cases
Supreme Court reviews interpretation of statutes for
correctness.
[4] Mechanics' Liens €=>310(1)
257k310(1) Most Cited Cases
Flexible-and-reasoned approach, not net-judgment
rule, applied when determining which party was the
"successful party" for purposes of awarding
attorney fees in action to foreclose general
contractor's mechanic's lien, although verdict form
used by jury gave no indication of whether, or by
how
much,
jury
offset
homeowners'
breach-of-contract
claim
against
general
contractor's claim. West's U.C.A. § 38-1-18(1).
[5] Appeal and Error €^H77(9)
30k 1177(9) Most Cited Cases
Remand to trial court was warranted for purpose of
determining whether general contractor or
homeowners were entitled to award of attorney fees
as successful party in action to foreclose mechanic's
lien; application of flexible-and-reasoned approach
to determine which party prevailed required more
information about jury award for general
contractor's
claim
and
homeowners'
breach-of-contract claim than was available in
record. West's U.C.A. § 38-1-18(1).
[6] Mechanics' Liens €==>310(1)
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257k310(l) Most Cited Cases
Determination of "successful party" under statute
requiring court to award attorney fees to successful
party in action to foreclose mechanic's lien should
occur before calculation required under statute
allowing defendant in mechanic's lien foreclosure
action to be awarded attorney fees if judgment
finally obtained by plaintiff is not more favorable
than defendant's offer of judgment; any attorney
fees awarded under statute governing award of
attorney fees to successful parties should then be
included in calculation of whether offer of judgment
was greater than judgment finally obtained at trial.
West's U.C.A.§ 38-1-18(1, 3).
[7] Statutes €^188
361kl88 Most Cited Cases
Supreme Court looks first to the plain language of a
statute to determine its meaning.
[8] Statutes €^>190
361kl90 Most Cited Cases
Only when there is ambiguity does Supreme Court
look further than plain language of statute.
[9] Statutes €==>206
361k206 Most Cited Cases
Statutory enactments are to be so construed as to
render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful,
and interpretations are to be avoided which render
some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd.
*354 Ray G. Martineau, Anthony R. Martineau,
Brett D. Cragun, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
Vincent C. Rampton, Ross I. Romero, Salt Lake
City, for defendants.
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
DURHAM, Chief Justice:
**1 This case concerns a mechanic's lien and suit
for breach of contract brought by petitioner J.
Pochynok
Company
(Pochynok)
against
respondents Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud (the
Smedsruds), who counterclaimed for breach of
contract. We granted certiorari to consider (1)
whether the court of appeals erred in upholding the

trial court's determination that the Smedsruds were
the "successful party" under Utah Code section
38-1-18(1) when the jury returned only a general
verdict that did not indicate which party prevailed
on which claims, and (2) whether Pochynok's
potential award of attorney fees as the successful
party should be taken into account under Utah Code
section 38-1-18(3) when calculating whether the
Smedsruds' offer of judgment was greater than the
final judgment ultimately obtained by Pochynok.
The trial court awarded the Smedsruds attorney fees
under section 38-1-18(1) as the successful party and
under section 38-1-18(3) because their offer of
judgment was greater than the judgment finally
obtained by Pochynok. The court of appeals
affirmed. We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND
**2 The Smedsruds hired Pochynok in August
1998 as the general contractor in charge of building
their home in Summit County, Utah. In the fall of
1999, the Smedsruds fell behind in payments to
Pochynok. In response, Pochynok filed a
mechanic's lien for approximately $74,000 plus
interest and attorney fees. Pochynok then brought
suit against the Smedsruds to foreclose on the lien
and for breach of contract. The Smedsruds
counterclaimed, alleging that Pochynok had
breached
the
contract
through
defective
workmanship and delay in completing construction.
**3 Twelve days before trial, the Smedsruds made
an offer of judgment to Pochynok in the amount of
$40,000 "in complete and final settlement of all
claims," including "court costs and attorneys' fees."
Pochynok rejected this offer, and the case
proceeded to jury trial. At trial, Pochynok asserted
a *355 claim for $81,269.91, not including costs
and attorney fees. The Smedsruds, in turn, claimed
an unspecified amount of offsets and damages for
unearned supervisor fees and work defects and
delays. At the conclusion of trial, the jury awarded
Pochynok a verdict of $7076.56. The verdict form
used by the jury gave no indication of whether, or
by how much, the jury offset the Smedsruds' claims
against Pochynok's claim. [FN1]
FN1. The verdict form given to the jury
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allowed it to designate, on one line, the
amount awarded Pochynok against the
Smedruds and, on the second line, the
amount awarded to the Smedruds against
Pochynok. The jury wrote $7076.56 on the
first line and left the second line blank.
**4 The Smedsruds filed a posttrial motion to
recover costs and attorney fees in the amount of
$84,036. In support of this motion, they argued that
under the provisions of Utah Code section
38-1-18(3), they were entitled to recover attorney
fees and costs incurred after the offer was made
because their offer of judgment was greater than the
judgment finally obtained by Pochynok. In addition,
they argued that they were the "successful party"
under Utah Code section 38-1-18(1) and were
therefore entitled to all costs and attorney fees.
Pochynok filed its own motion for an award of costs
and attorney fees in the amount of $39,761, also
arguing that it was the successful party under
section 38-1-18(1).
**5 Despite the jury's award of $7076.56 to
Pochynok, the trial court ruled that the Smedsruds
were the "successful party" for purposes of Utah
Code section 38-1-18(1), denying Pochynok's
motion and awarding the Smedsruds costs and
attorney fees in the amount of $84,036.54. Other
than general references to arguments made by the
Smedsruds, the trial court's order contained no
findings of fact or conclusions of law to explain its
decision. In addition, the court made an explicit
award to the Smedsruds for attorney fees incurred
after the date of the offer of judgment, but it did not
provide a detailed explanation of how section
31-1-18(3) operated in this case. Pochynok
appealed.
**6 The court of appeals upheld the trial court's
award of costs and fees. J. Pochynok Co. v.
Smedsrud, 2003 UT App 375, f 1, 80 P.3d 563.
In doing so, it applied the "flexible and reasoned
approach," later approved by this court in A.K. & R.
Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen
Construction, 2004 UT 47, fl 25-26, 94 P.3d
270, to conclude that the trial court properly
determined the Smedsruds to be the successful

party. Pochynok, 2003 UT App 375 at f 15, 80
P.3d 563. The court of appeals noted that the jury's
verdict did "not provide precise calculations of
offsets the jury may have made for the Smedsruds'
counterclaims" but that the trial court "could have
reasonably inferred" that the jury awarded the
Smedsruds $74,193.35 in offsets and could have
concluded that the Smedsruds were the successful
party on that basis. Id at f 17. The court of
appeals did not reach a specific conclusion on how
to apply section 38-l-18(3)'s offer of judgment rule,
but approved the trial court's presumed
consideration of the rejected offer of judgment in its
successful party determination. Id. at f 20.
**7 On certiorari, Pochynok argues (1) that
despite our recent decision in Whipple, the trial
court and court of appeals should have employed
the net judgment rule instead of the flexible and
reasoned approach to determine the successful
party; (2) that regardless of the rule used, neither
the trial court nor the court of appeals could have
properly determined that the Smedsruds were the
successful party in this action because the jury
verdict did not provide sufficient information to
reach such a conclusion, making Pochynok, as the
only party to receive an award, the successful party;
and (3) that if Pochynok is determined to be the
successful party and awarded costs and attorney
fees pursuant to section 38-1-18(1), this post trial
award should be considered part of "the judgment
finally obtained" under section 38-1- 18(3),
preventing the Smedsruds from receiving postoffer
costs and attorney fees pursuant to that section.
[FN2]
FN2. We do not address the additional
argument raised by Pochynok regarding
whether delay damages can be used to
offset a mechanic's lien. Pochynok cited no
authority for this proposition, nor is it
adequately briefed, and we therefore
decline to address it. See State v. Thomas,
961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998).
*356 STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1][2][3] **8 "On certiorari, we review the
decision of the court of appeals, not the decision of
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the trial court." Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza,
923 P.2d 1389, 1392 (Utah 1996) (internal
quotation omitted). "When reviewing attorney fee
decisions that involve questions of law, we review
for correctness." A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing &
Heating v. Aspen Constr., 2004 UT 47, f 6, 94
P.3d 270. We use the same standard when
construing statutes. Id.
ANALYSIS
I. INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 38-1-18
A. Subsection (1): Successful Party Determination
[4] **9 Utah law expressly requires a court to
award attorney fees to the successful party in any
mechanic's lien action. Utah Code Ann. § 381-18(1) (2001); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing &
Heating v. Aspen Constr., 2004 UT 47, % 7, 94
P.3d 270. Section 38-1-18(1) provides that "in any
action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter
the successful party shall be entitled to recover a
reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court."
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1). We most recently
construed this statute in Whipple, 2004 UT 47, 94
P.3d 270. Whipple, much like the case now before
us, involved a mechanics' lien foreclosure action
and a counterclaim for damages. Id. at f 2.
Plaintiff Whipple filed a lien for $30,641, with
defendant Aspen claiming an offset of $25,000 for
Whipple's allegedly negligent work. Id. at | 3.
The trial court awarded Aspen $7000 in offsets and,
"[a]fter calculating the consequences of the parties'
respective wins and losses on their competing
claims, ... awarded a net judgment to Aspen in the
amount of $527." Id. Employing the "flexible and
reasoned approach" first outlined in Mountain
States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551,
556-57 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (mem. decision on pet.
for reh'g), the trial court found that, where one party
received such a small net recovery, the case was
essentially a "draw," so neither party could be
considered "successful" for purposes of section
38-1-18(1). Whipple, 2004 UT 47 at 1 4, 94 P.3d
270. We upheld both the trial court's use of the
flexible and reasoned approach and its specific
finding that there was no successful party. Id. at |
f 31-32.
**10 Here, Pochynok seeks to distinguish Whipple

from the present case and urges us to hold that the
net judgment rule and not the flexible and reasoned
approach should apply in cases with general rather
than specific jury verdicts. Under the net judgment
rule, the party that receives the bigger judgment is
the successful party. Since Pochynok received a net
judgment of approximately $7000, it would be the
successful party under this rule. Certainly it is more
difficult-although not impossible~to apply the
flexible and reasoned approach where, as here, the
jury verdict does not specify who won what.
However, it does not follow that the net judgment
rule automatically applies in such a case. As we
stated in Whipple, "rigid application of the net
judgment rule can result in unreasonable awards of
attorney fees," id at ^ 26, which "would deprive
trial courts of their power to apply their discretion
and common sense to this issue," id. at f 25. As in
Whipple, we decline to require such a rule here.
[5] **11 At the same time, it is clear that the
nature of the flexible and reasoned approach
outlined in Mountain States and Whipple requires
more information about the jury award for the
parties' particular claims than is available in this
case. In Mountain States, the court of appeals first
considered which party received a net judgment and
then discussed two additional factors relevant to its
determination of which party was successful. 783
P.2d at 558. First, it focused on which party had
attained a "comparative victory," considering what
total victory would have meant for each party and
what a true draw would look like. Id. Second, it
looked at which party obtained a greater percentage
of the amount originally claimed. Id. Such an
analysis in this case is impossible without more
specific monetary figures.
**12 Similarly, we stated in Whipple that "[the
flexible and reasoned] approach requires ... looking
at the amounts actually *357 sought and then
balancing them proportionally with what was
recovered." 2004 UT 47 at \ 26, 94 P.3d 270
(internal quotation and citation omitted). In the
present case, because the jury's verdict did not
indicate specific awards and offsets, the trial court
did not have the information necessary to undertake
such a balancing. Nor did the court explain its
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reasoning in concluding that the Smedsruds were
the successful party. The case before us is thus in
contrast to Whipple, where we stated:
Although lacking in detail, the trial court's
explanation of its rationale is adequate because it
demonstrates that the court correctly considered
common sense factors in addition to the net
judgment. It is apparent from the trial court's
reasoning that it believed Aspen's net recovery of
only two percent (2%) of its claimed damages
was insufficient to make it the "successful party."
Id. at f 28. In upholding the trial court's
determination of the successful party, the court of
appeals inappropriately relied on conjecture,
surmising that, despite the nonspecific jury award.,
"the trial court could have reasonably inferred ...
offsets" and "could have reasonably concluded that
the jury in fact found in favor of the Smedsruds on
their counterclaims and offset these damages." J.
Pochynok Co. v. Smedsrud, 2003 UT App 375, \
17, 80 P.3d 563. There is nothing in the record to
indicate that the trial court actually made such
inferences and conclusions.
**13 Though this insufficiency of information
requires that we direct the court of appeals to
remand this case to the trial court for a
determination of awards and offsets, it does not
necessarily follow, as Pochynok contends, that
Pochynok is the successful party. Our difficulty is
with the trial court's process, not necessarily the
outcome. After a determination of the awards and
offsets likely considered and made by the jury, it is
entirely possible that the trial court might once
again conclude that the Smedsruds are the
successful party.

offeree shall pay the costs and attorneys' fees
incurred by the offeror after the offer was made.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(3) (2001). Pochynok
argues that if it is held to be the successful party
under Utah Code section 38-1-18(1), the resulting
award of attorney fees against the Smedsruds should
be included as part of the "final judgment obtained"
pursuant to Utah Code section 38-1-18(3). In other
words, Pochynok suggests that the determination of
which party is successful under section 38-1-18(1)
must be made before a court may determine under
section 38-1-18(3) whether the judgment finally
obtained is greater than the offer of judgment. The
Smedsruds claim the opposite, arguing that an
award of attorney fees under subsection (3) should
be included in a determination of which party was
successful for purposes of subsection (1).
Subsection (3) was added to section 38-1-18 in
2001. Its operation in conjunction with subsection
(1) is a matter offirstimpression in this court.
[7][8][9] **15 We look first to the plain language
of a statute to determine its meaning. Stephens v.
Bonneville Travel, 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997).
Only when there is ambiguity do we look further.
Id. In addition, "statutory enactments are to be so
construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and
meaningful, and ... interpretations are to be avoided
which render some part of a provision nonsensical
or absurd." Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d
934,936 (Utah 1980).
**16 In construing section 38-1-18(3), the court of
appeals held that "the trial court's consideration of
the refused offer of judgment in this case was
appropriate in its successful party determination."
Pochynok, 2003 UT App 375 at 1 19, 80 P.3d 563.
Bypassing a consideration of the statute's plain
*358 language, the court of appeals looked to the
legislative history of subsection (3), noting that it
was added to the statute in 2001 "in an effort to
curb wrongful, outrageous, and fraudulent lien
claims." Id at f 18 (citing ch. 257, 2001 Utah
Laws 1202). As a result of this clear legislative
policy, the court of appeals concluded that any
award of attorney fees under subsection (3) should
be considered in the determination of which party is
successful under subsection one. Id. at f 19. In

B. Subsection (3): Offer ofJudgment
[6] **14 We now consider Pochynok's claims in
regard to subsection (3) of the mechanic's lien
attorney fees statute. Utah Code section 38-1-18(3)
provides:
A party against whom any action is brought to
enforce a lien under this chapter may make an
offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. If the offer is not
accepted and the judgment finally obtained by the
offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the
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further support of this conclusion, the court quoted
a legislative note, stating:
[TJhe primary inequity in the mechanic's lien law
as it currently operates is that a party can assert a
claim for much more than he or she is
legitimately owed forcing a defendant to litigate
the claim, and yet still be entitled to attorney[ ]
fees as the "prevailing party" even if the lien
claimant only recovers a fraction of what was
originally claimed.
Matfl8.
**17 While this statement may accurately reflect
the policy behind section 38-1-18 in general and
subsection (3) in particular, we do not agree with
the analysis of the court of appeals to the extent that
it overlooks important realities regarding offers of
judgment. We thus hold that the "judgment finally
obtained" language in Utah Code section 38-1-18(3)
includes an award of attorney fees to the successful
party under section 38- 1-18(1). In other words, if
the offer of judgment explicitly includes attorney
fees, [FN3] and turns out to be greater than the
offeree's jury verdict plus any attorney fees awarded
to the offeree as the successful party under section
38-1-18(1), then subsection (3) requires the offeree
to pay the offeror's costs and attorney fees incurred
after the offer was made.
FN3. Although it has no bearing on the
outcome of this case, we note that, under
the current version of rule 68 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs
offers of judgment under section
38-1-18(3), we would reach the same
result unless the offer explicitly excluded
attorney fees. The rule was amended in
2004 to specifically require that, "[ujnless
otherwise specified, an offer made under
this rule ... is an offer to resolve all claims
between the parties to the date of the offer,
including costs, interest and, if attorney
fees are permitted by law or contract,
attorney fees." Utah R. Civ. P. 68(a).
**18 The plain language and structure of the
statute support this interpretation of subsection (3).
Subsection (3) was added to the end of the

already-existing section 38-1-18, suggesting it is an
addition to, and not a starting point for, the required
analysis under the statute. It also requires
comparison of the offer of judgment to the
"judgment finally obtained." Utah Code Ann. §
38-1-18(3) (emphasis added). This formulation
implies a finality that cannot be reconciled with a
judgment that has yet to include the ultimate
"successful party" determination under subsection

0).
**19 We recognize, however, that the plain
language of subsection (3) does not entirely
eliminate ambiguity regarding the correct order of
operation of subsections (1) and (3). We therefore
also consider legislative history and policy. See
Stephens, 935 P.2d at 520. We conclude that
including successful party attorney fees awarded
under subsection (1) in the subsection (3)
calculation does not interfere with the policy goals
behind section 38- 1-18. The preamble to the
legislature's 2001 amendment indicates that the
purpose of subsection (3) is to "provide[ ] for costs
and attorneys' fees in cases where an offer of
judgment is unreasonably rejected." Ch. 257, 2001
Utah Laws 1202. As the court of appeals pointed
out, the legislature's goal in adding subsection (3)
was to discourage unreasonable rejections of offers
of judgment. See supra Tf 16. Interpreting the
"judgment finally obtained" under subsection (3) to
include an award of attorney fees under subsection
(1) does nothing to contravene that policy as long as
the offer of judgment also included attorney fees.
An offeree who rejects an offer of judgment that
includes attorney fees and then receives a judgment,
also including attorney fees, that is greater than the
offer of judgment clearly has not acted
unreasonably.
**20 We are cognizant of the concern expressed
in the legislative note attached to the 2001
amendment to section 38-1-18, which the court of
appeals cited in support of its contrary
interpretation of the statute's operation. However,
that concern is largely resolved *359 through the
use of the flexible and reasoned approach which, we
concluded above, was proper to determine the
successful party under subsection (1). Under this
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approach, a party that makes an outrageous claim
and then receives only a fraction of what it
demanded will not likely be deemed the successful
party. This approach also prevents a party judged
"successful" from being required to pay attorney
fees under subsection (3). Although this can create
something of a winner-takes-all situation when it
comes to attorney fees, this tendency is effectively
balanced by the use of the flexible and reasoned
approach in determining successful party status so
that no party can expect to be the successful party
simply because it receives a dollar more than the
other party. In fact, the flexible and reasoned
approach was first adopted in order to avoid
situations such as those mentioned in the legislative
note, in which the difference of a sum as negligible
as one dollar could entitle one party to an award of
attorney fees. Mountain States, 783 P.2d at 557.
This approach "ensures that only parties that are
genuinely 'successful1 according to the trial court's
common sense logic will be able to extract their
attorney fees from their opponents." Whipple, 2004
UT47atf25,94P.3d270.

section 38-1-18(1) would too easily allow an offeror
to benefit by making an unfair offer.

**21 Finally, we construe statutes to ensure that
there will be no absurd results, particularly in the
interplay of subsections of a single statute. See
Millett, 609 P.2d at 936. Interpreting subsection (3)
to operate before subsection one would allow a
party to manipulate section 38-1-18 so as to achieve
an unfair award of attorney fees. Though there is
no such allegation here, the present case illustrates
this potential problem. The Smedsruds' $40,000
offer of judgment was made on the eve of trial, by
which time each party had incurred substantial legal
fees. The offer of $40,000 explicitly included
attorney fees, but represented less than half the
amount Pochynok was claiming as damages at trial.
If we were to hold that the "judgment finally
obtained" does not include award of attorney fees
under subsection (1), a party defending against a
lien could make an offer of judgment, including
attorney fees, that is well below what is fair for both
the lien and the attorney fees but that is higher than
what the other party could hope to win at trial
exclusive of attorney fees. An interpretation of
section 38-1-18(3) that does not account for an
award of attorney fees to the successful party under

**23 In addition, we reverse the court of appeals'
construction of the interplay between subsections
(1) and (3) of section 38-1-18. We hold that the
determination of the "successful party" under
subsection (1) should occur before the calculation
required under subsection (3) and that any attorney
fees awarded under subsection (1) should then be
included in the subsection (3) calculation of
whether any offer of judgment was greater than the
judgment finally obtained at trial.

CONCLUSION
**22 We uphold the court of appeals' use of the
flexible and reasoned approach in its review of the
trial court's determination of the "successful party"
for purposes of section 38-1-18(1). However, we
conclude that the trial court could not have made
this determination without specific information
regarding the total amount the jury awarded to
Pochynok and the total amount in offsets it awarded
to the Smedsruds. Mountain States and Whipple
clearly contemplate a balancing of awards and
offsets as part of the flexible and reasoned
approach. The jury did not provide this information
in its verdict form. In order to apply the flexible
and reasoned approach in this case, therefore, the
trial court should have made findings regarding the
amounts sought and won by each party. It should
then have conducted a common sense inquiry and
balancing in regard to who was the successful party.
The trial court failed to do so here.

**24 We remand this case to the court of appeals
with instructions to remand to the trial court for a
factual determination of awards and offsets,
followed by a ruling on who is the successful party
under Utah Code section 38-1-18(1) and whether an
award of *360 attorney fees under Utah Code
section 38-1-18(3) is proper.
**25 Associate Chief Justice WILKINS, Justice
DURRANT, Justice PARRISH, and Justice
NEHRING concur in Chief Justice DURHAM'S
opinion.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., a
Corporation
Plaintiff(s),

OFFER OF JUDGMENT
Civil No. 0006000014

vs.

Judge J. Dennis Frederick
GREGORY SMEDSRUD; LOUANN
SMEDSRUD; BUTTERFIELD LUMBER,
INC., a Corporation; PELLA PRODUCTS,
INC., a Corporation; BLAZE WHARTON
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Corporation;
DIXIE WOODWORKS, INC., a Corporation;
and JEFREY KAISER, doing business as RIO
GRANDE PAINTING,
Defendant(s).

TO:

PLAINTIFF AND COUNTERCLAIM DEFENDANT J. POCHYNOK COMPANY,
INC. AND COUNSEL
Pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah Code Ann. §38-1-

18(3), defendants and counterclaim plaintiffs, Greg and LouAnn Smedsrud, offer to allow
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Offer of
Judgment was sent via facsimile and hand delivery, to the following this

^^-dayofMay,

2002:

Ray G. Martineau
Anthony R. Martineau
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., a
Corporation,
Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant,

JURY VERDICT

02.01 ol3z?
vs.

Civil No. 0006000011'

GREGORY SMEDSRUD; LOUANN
SMEDSRUD; BUTTERFIELD LUMBER,
INC., a Corporation; PELLA PRODUCTS,
INC., a Corporation; BLAZE WHARTON
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Corporation;
DIXIE WOODWORKS, INC., a Corporation;
and JEFREY KAISER, doing business as RIO
GRANDE PAINTING,

Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants and Counterclaim
Plaintiffs.

We, the jury, duly empaneled in the above-entitled matter, hold as follows in the aboveentitled action:
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Pochynok Company, Inc., and against defendants Gregory .and LouAnn Smedsrud, in the amount

-n

3:0?(P^A
2.

Basedon the lawas it hnsbmn'xpl.um J li>

.- dm! mi In u of 4 h luhiiil,

Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud, and against plaintiffs J. Pochynok Company, Inc., In the
amount of $ :

_

DATED this

.
'J-.X~ dayofM;iv, "in'
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- Jury Foreperson '
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IMAGED
'SMBSBW.r
VINCENT C. RAMPTON (USB #2684)
ROSS I. ROMERO (USB #7771)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 ...
Telephone: (801)521-3200

%.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., a
Corporation,
Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant,

ENTERED IN REGISTRY
OF JUDGMENTS
JUDGMENTS
DATE

JUDGMENT UPON VERDICT AND
ORDER ON POST TRIAL MOTIONS

vs.
GREGORY SMEDSRUD; LOUANN
SMEDSRUD; BUTTERFIELD LUMBER,
INC., a Corporation; PELLA PRODUCTS,
INC., a Corporation; BLAZE WHARTON
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Corporation;
DIXIE WOODWORKS, INC., a Corporation;
and JEFREY KAISER, doing business as RIO
GRANDE PAINTING,

ozoqotezi
Civil No. -009600001^
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants and Counterclaim
Plaintiffs.
This matter was tried to a jury on May 21 and 22,2002. Prior to trial, all crossclaims
between defendants Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud and Pella Products, Inc. had been dismissed
with prejudice pursuant to stipulation and prior order of this Court. In addition, all claims of

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc. against defendants Blaze Whar
Jeffrey Kaiser were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice pursuant 10 K ule 4 i (a), t -lai* Ruleof ( ' m l I'micdurc prim lim Until

On May 22,2002, the jury 'returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff J. Pochynok v^uinp - Inc. and against Gregory Smedsrud and LouAnn Smedsrud, in the amount of $ 7 , 0 7 6 . ^ Tlv- iu? y
iiiiiiinn ii no vcniiel in illiivni oil ain

HIIIMT puily

lirnlo

• ' ' •'

•.

' -•

Following trial, both parties- submitted motions tor award of costs and attorneys fees
incurred u the aaiw

m addition, uic plaiuliil submitted a motion for injunctive relief, askinr

• \s ^n* * Ycilarul, Ku:l V. Nesseth and Locus Architecture, Ltd., by reason of Mr. Yelland
/

having agreed to appear and testify at ti ial liei ein
The Court having reviewed the parties'' post ti ial mo tic ns and suppoi ting siibiit i f I „ 11 s
• being fully advised, and good cause appearing,
II IS HKKHMYORDMRI'h, adjudged i m i M a i c a l us Inllovvs:
1.

• '''

The motion of Defendants Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud to tax costs and

attorneys fees is granted for those reasons set out in defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support
of Motion to Fax Costs .mil 'illnmi y, I n". , 11 N I Ihnit I'cph l\li

IIIKH

imlum mi Suppml ml IMnlii ill

to Tax Costs and Attorneys Fees.
2.

Plaintiff . Minimi I >i iiijiiiiciiic Kdicl is denied, lor niose reasons set out in

•defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion foi Injuncth c • R elief.
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n

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3.

Plaintiffs Motion for Award of Attorneys Fees and Costs is denied for those

reasons set out in defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Award of
Attorneys Fees and Costs, defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Tax Costs
and Attorneys Fees, and their Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Tax Costs and
Attorneys Fees.
4.

Based upon the foregoing rulings and upon the jury verdict in this matter, final

judgment is hereby entered as follows:
a.

Judgment is entered in favor of plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc., and

against defendants Gregory Smedsrud and LouAnn Smedsrud, jointly and
severally, in the amount of $7,076.56, together with interest thereon from and
after May 22, 2002 until paid in full at the contract rate of 12% per annum.
b.;

Judgment is hereby entered in favor of defendants Gregory and LouAnn

Smedsrud, jointly and severally, and against plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc.,
in thefollowingamounts:
i.

$1,906.94, representing defendants' costs of suit incurred prior to

. May9,2002;
ii.

$48,083.10, representing defendants' attorneys fees incurred prior

toMay9,2002;
ill.

$766.50, representing defendants' costs of suit incurred on and

after May 9,2002;

548588vl
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i v.

ij3,280.00, representing defendants1" attorneys fees incurred on

and after May 9, 2002; and
• ' - ' v.
• • ;}f. ...
c. •

Intcresl on the liiiq»oii)|» ..iiiioiiiilLs

IMHII

until paid in full, at the contract rate of 12" o.

••

•' •

It is further ordered that the award of defendants'costs and attorneys fees

ns STI out iiliuvi: itiiiry Uv iitipjiinilnl in

mill rt|ii<il lu .nil i osls citiii .illnii) y11.

ices wii urred hv defendants' from and dih i Inn*
and ... uv>iicL-lh*ii • 4i». -mlgment entered i.i'iUi

5.

>inil .ilfti IMay J1 !, i(MI2

M- ) ,n the enibrcui*wiil
nvn rurther application i^

I'Jajt1.'! i # s petition loi <m order of foreclosure of us mechanic's hen heir: - ^

denied. asitsju* -j

. •

. , i

.. he owners ,. ;..

.

. *...

lu upncnl

.;i ,<v

Smedsruds herein.
6.
i(

II|HIII

Plaintiff is hereby ordered to i elease all liens and notices of liens placed by or for

mil Smedsi'i'l' indwirc loi jlr d »»'Sii'»'iinM 'Hiitty S'.ilt • ' " 'l.ih !iiui«; pajlirularly

described as

follows:

•"•.•>>•'

A1J o f L o t 1 j ^ p l N E R I D G E S U B D I

Y I S I 0 N J a c c o r di n g t o

the
official plat thereof filed in the office of the Recorder of Summit
County, State of Utah.

(hereafter "Smedsrud Property"), Plaintiff is hereby declared u *\nlv no n^hi * Ac or interev,:_
ami lo llir Snietlsiiiil hopnlv.
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i'> further ordered lo - lease anvand „
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,.jikv.s -t Lis

Pendens filed against the Smedsrud Property with the Summit County Recorder's office in
connection with this action.
7.

Defendants Butterfield Lumber, Inc., Pella Products, Inc., Blaze Wharton

Construction, Inc., Dixie Woodworks, Inc., and Jeffrey Kaiser, having failed to present any proof
to the court in support of any claims which they have or may have against any party hereto, or to
obtain any verdict or judgment in their favor, are determined to hold no right, title or interest in
and to the Smedsrud Property, whether jointly or severally, by virtue of any right of mechanic's
lien asserted by or on behalf of said defendants (or any of them) against the Smedsrud Property.
Said defendants are hereby ordered to release all liens and notices of mechanics' or
materialman's lien placed by or for them upon the Smedsrud Property.
8.

Any and all claims asserted by or against any party to this action, to the extent not

otherwise addressed in this judgment and order, are hereby deemed dismissed with prejudice and
on the merits.
DATED this

l^f

day of August, 2002.
BY THE COURT
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the . "'"'• day of August, 2002,1 caused to be hand-delivered ;-

ORDER ON POST TRIAL MOTIONS to the following:
Ray G. Martineau
Anthony R. Martineau
Brett D. Cragun
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Scott L. Wiggins
ARNOLD & WIGGINS
American Plaza II, ste. I OS
57 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Randall R. Smart
Snow, Nuffer
341 South Main Street, #303
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

/:

Ralph R. Tate
4625 South 2300 East, Ste. 206
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
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FILED BSOTCT CGUSli
Third Judicial District

MAR G 3 2006
By

Vincent C. Rampton (USB #2684)
Ross I. Romero (USB #7771)
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC
Attorneys for Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud
170 South Main Street, Suite #1500
Post Office Box 45444
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444
Telephone: (801)521-3200

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., a
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
GREGORY SMEDSRUD; LOUANN
SMEDSRUD; BUTTERFIELD LUMBER,
INC.; PELLA PRODUCTS, INC., a
corporation; BLAZE WHARTON
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a corporation; DIXIE
WOODWORKS, INC., a corporation; and
JEFREY KAISER, dba RIO GRANDE
PAINTING,

FINDINGS OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE COSTS
AND ATTORNEYS FEES
-*- OZP60.
Civil No. 020901328
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.

Pursuant to directive of the Utah Supreme Court by Opinion dated June 24,2005, the Court
enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law with respect to its award of costs and
attorneys fees to Defendants Gregory Smedsrud and LouAnn Smedsrud ("Smedsruds") in the above. ,

,

«mtkd utter.

Smedsruds*
of J.
Fact
andClark
Conclusions
ofBYU.
Law
Digitized by the Howard
W. HunterFindings
Law Library,
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Law School,
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'

F I N D I N G S O F F AC I

1. . ' This matter was tried to a jury on May 21 and 22, 2002. '
= '

2i .••

.

••

F PudniioR ( ompany liu (' Plaintiff ' ) had filed a complaint against Gregory Smeduml

a i d Lou Ann Smedsrud ("Smedsruds") to foreclose a mechanic's lien asserted foi work allegedly
performed to the Smedsruds' residence located at 7100 Canyon Road in Summit County, State of IJtal i

County Recorder's office on October 19, 1999, in the amount of $ 7 4 3 6 0 . 5 1 , together with interest, $100
in costs and attorneys' fees. See Exhibit 1 hereto

Defendants' protu- i> on Jul} 2o, 1999 in the amount ui $i,>u,UU0, plus interest, cost* and a t t u i i u ^
fees See Exhibit 2,
5.

Plaintiff also brought claims against 1:1 IC Smedsruds for bKNU'h of a mlim'1 iimil i|iMiitm 1 1

^••6.

IlliHi Siiioclsilids uHJiitm liiininml .is Ailing d e l a i n e i*oikiiMiisliip iinil Liiliin I n i u m p l c k

meruit.

the project.
7.
(IIMIII.SSI'II

8.

.
Pella Products, Inc had asserted a crossclaim against Smedsrud; this, howevei , had been

vi ilh |in

IIKIHI"

pur

II.IIII

In stiipul ilmn

JIIHI

pi mi mill 1 4 lllii ( "null,

In addition., all claims of Plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc. against Defendants Blaze

Wharton Construction, Inc. and Jcllrcy Kaiser were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice pursuant *~
Rule 41(a), Utah Rules of Civil h w n l i
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9.

At trial, Plaintiff asserted a claim against Defendants in the amount of $81,269.91

(exclusive of costs and attorneys'fees).
10.

Plaintiff offered inconsistent calculations, however, for money allegedly owed in the

computation of its claim. Specifically, documentary evidence was introduced at trial showing
inconsistent demands by Plaintiff for payment.
11.

In addition, evidence was introduced that Plaintiff had filed the July 26,1999 notice of

mechanics' lien against Smedsruds' residence at a time when significant draw requests had recently been
paid.
12.

Smedsruds presented evidence challenging Plaintiffs accounting work, and establishing

that Plaintiffs claim at trial, and its second notice of mechanics' lien, were excessive.
13.

Smedsruds also presented evidence that they were entitled to significant offsets for

unearned supervisor fees, work defects and delays. Specifically, Smedsruds presented evidence that
a.

Paint work had been double charged, resulting in overcharge of $23,087.07;

b.

Plaintiffs contractor fee on the paint work overcharged was likewise unwarranted,

resulting in an overcharge of $2,308.71;
c.

Smedsruds had been subjected to unwarranted delay costs of $3,118.75; and

d.

Plaintiffs lien had been overstated, permitting offset in an amount equal to twice the

overcharge amount, which Smedsruds placed at $ 11,535.96.
14.

Smedsruds further produced evidence that they had never received a consistent

accounting from Plaintiff despite nearly three years of negotiations and attempts, contradictory and
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
inconsistent claimsDigitized
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discuss a consistent claim in light of Defendants' demands and offsets, the case would not have gone to
trial; absent a cogent accounting, though, Defendants had no choice but to submit the matter for a jury to
decide
15.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury returned a general verdict in favor of Plaintiff

in the amount of only $7,076.56.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

With respect to an award of costs and attorneys fees to the "successful party'* in this

action, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1), this Court is charged with applying a "flexible and
reasoned approach" to the parties' relative successes in establishing their claims at trial - AK&R Whipple
Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Construction, 2004 Utah 47,ffl25-26, 94 P.3d 270.
2.

At trial, Plaintiff asserted claims exceeding $81,000; Smedsruds, however (1) challenged

the propriety of Plaintiff s accounting and claim, and (2) asserted an offset claim of $40,050.49, together
with accrued judgment interest.
3.

As such, Plaintiff recovered on only a small fraction of its original claim, which was

reduced by a factor even greater than the dollar amount of Smedsruds' claimed offsets.
4.

The trial court found Smedsruds' challenge to Plaintiffs claim, coupled with their

asserted offsets, more persuasive than Plaintiffs offered evidence in support of its claim.
5.

The trial court was further persuaded that, had Plaintiff offered an accurate accounting to

Smedsruds, trial by jury might have been averted.
6.

Under these circumstances, the court concludes that Smedsruds obtained a comparative

the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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7.

The court further concludes that Smedsruds obtained a full percentage of their claimed

8.

Accordingly, the court concludes that Smedsruds were the "successful party" at trial, for

offsets.

purposes of Utah Code Ann. §38-1-18(1).
9.

In light of the foregoing, the court affirms its prior award of costs and attorneys fees to

Smedsruds, and its prior denial of costs and attorneys fees to Plaintiff.
10.

In light of the foregoing, the court likewise reaffirms its award of Smedsruds' costs and

attorneys fees incurred after May 9, 2002, pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 38-1-18(3), given that
Smedsruds' May 9,2002 Offer of Judgment was greater than Plaintiffs actual recoveiy at trial, with or
without an award of costs and attorneys fees under Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1),
X

11.

The court therefore reaffirms its judgment upon verdict and order on post-trial motions

entered August 15, 2002, as that order and judgment may hereafter be supplemented in the amount of
any post-judgment costs and attorneys fees incurred by Smedsruds as may hereafter be established by
affidavit.
DATED this

/ - " c l a y of March, 2006
BYT]
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27lh day of February, 2006,1 caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing proposed FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, to be mailed,
postage prepaid, to the following:

Ray G. Martineau
Anthony R. Martineau
Brett D. Cragun
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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